UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/2000/1
4 January 2000
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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 3 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States and British aircraft based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey continued between 16 and 31 December 1999 and that the aircraft in question engaged in acts of aggression, reconnaissance activities and acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the facilities for these acts of aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

These actions are continuing to bring death and injury to hundreds of civilians and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The logistic support that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey provide to the United States and British forces makes them key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they share international responsibility for the consequences of these actions. The Government of the Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek lawful compensation for the damage being inflicted on its people by these same actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations by United States and British aircraft and damage caused, 16-31 December 1999

1. In the northern region 54 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1230 hours on 24 December 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out eight missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Aqrah and Tall Afar areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1330 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1150 hours on 29 December 1999 United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1310 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1100 hours on 30 December 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Irbil, Aqrah, Amadiyah and Zakho areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1510 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1105 hours on 31 December 1999 United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Zakho, Ayn Zalah, Aqrah, Mosul, Tall Afar and Irbil areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1305 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 130 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 0730 hours on 26 December 1999 United States and British F-14 and F-15 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out six missions from Saudi territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Salman, Ushbayjah, Lasaf and Taqtaqanah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0800 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 0740 hours on 27 December 1999 United States and British F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 12 missions from Saudi territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Lasaf and Ushbayjah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0830 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 0755 hours on 28 December 1999 United States and British F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out eight missions from Saudi territory, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Ushbayjah, Lasaf, Ukhaydir and Ma'aniyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0845 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 0955 hours on 29 December 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 46 missions, 32 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 14 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Samawah, Salman, Basrah, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Hayy, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah and Ushbayjah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1530 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 0950 hours on 31 December 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 58 missions, 40 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 18 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Lasaf, Ushbayjah, Salman, Artawi, Jalibah, Busayyah, Qal'at Sukkar, Basrah, Shatrah, Rifa'i, Samawah, Amarah, Rumaythah, Nasiriyah and Qurnah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1100 hours, drove them off.

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LETTER DATED 4 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

With the support of the United Kingdom, the United States of America continues to obstruct implementation of the memorandum of understanding and the oil-for-food programme using a number of illegal stratagems, including abuse of its membership of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and its use of flimsy pretexts in order to put on hold contracts for the export to Iraq of humanitarian goods. As at 30 December 1999, the number of contracts on hold was 778, with a total value of $1.27 billion.

We have alerted the Secretariat and the Security Council to this illegal conduct on the part of the United States in numerous letters. Unfortunately, however, it does not appear that either of those parties is likely to make any serious effort to end this situation. On the contrary, we have observed that there are those in the Office of the Iraq Programme who, intimidated by the influence and authority exerted over the United Nations by the United States, occasionally attempt to adduce some justification for this behaviour.

When putting contracts on hold, the United States usually claims that there is insufficient information in the contracts or that the materials are dual-use. These claims are invalid and amount to interference in the concerns of the Secretariat and the Office of the Iraq Programme. Paragraph 33 of the list of procedures to be employed by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) in the discharge of its responsibilities (S/1996/636) provides that experts in the Secretariat shall examine each contract before it is submitted to the Committee, in particular the details of price and value, and whether the items to be exported are on the categorized list prepared by Iraq and approved by the Secretary-General. The report dated 30 January 1998 of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) on the refining and clarifying of its working procedures (S/1998/92) gave detailed elucidation of the duties of Secretariat experts with regard to the scrutiny of contracts. Paragraph (b) (ii) states that incomplete applications will not be circulated until clarification is obtained from the applicant State and the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. Paragraph (b) (iii) states that applications that are found to be inconsistent with the approved distribution plan and its amendments (for example, the items concerned are not on the categorized list annexed to the distribution plan or their quantities exceed those on the list) will not be circulated. Paragraph (b) (ix) states that

applications will be screened and reviewed by the Secretariat, which should circulate all applications that meet the requirements of the Committee's procedures and are consistent with the distribution plan.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Secretariat is responsible for ensuring that the contracts submitted meet the Committee's procedural requirements and are consistent with the distribution plan. The Secretariat is also responsible for monitoring the arrival and distribution of humanitarian goods in Iraq. Nevertheless, the representative of the United States ignores the responsibility of the Secretariat, just as he ignores the distribution plan approved by the Secretary-General, and subjects each contract to his own particular scrutiny, which is based on James Baker's well-known precept that Iraq should be bombed back to the pre-industrial age. The representative of the United States invents such pretexts for putting on hold contracts for humanitarian goods - and, in particular, spare parts - as the need to request further information on the goods itemized in the contract and the need to know final use, and it demands that certain goods be omitted from the contract or claims that there is a likelihood that the contract materials are dual-use. The Americans have expanded the term "dual-use materials" to cover almost everything, as is shown by the examples below.

Contract No. 4723 for water purification equipment was put on hold on the pretext that the materials might be on the list of dual-use items.

Contract No. 50211 for a flour mill was put on hold on the pretext that there might be some connection between the materials involved and biological weapons.

Contract No. 50882 for medical equipment was put on hold on the pretext of concern that it was dual-use.

Contract No. 60061 for spare parts for electricity-generating stations was put on hold on the pretext of concern that dual-use materials were involved.

The most recent farce relates to contract No. 600787, made by the Ministry of Agriculture with a French company for the import of 15 live bulls in order to improve the quality of livestock resources. On 29 November 1999 the United States put this contract on hold on the pretext that the bulls were dual-use.

The fact that live bulls could be considered dual-use items is a blatant example of the contempt shown by the representatives of the United States for the authority of the United Nations, the procedural requirements of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and for resolution 1051 (1996), which defines dual-use. We say nothing about United States contempt for the lives of the Iraqi people, a subject that has been dealt with exhaustively. The United States demonstrates the greatest disdain for the international community and the United Nations, which adopted the distribution plan and agreed upon the humanitarian materials it covered. This attitude reflects the superficial manner of thinking that leads to such situations as this and indicates that the United States has no objective standards for civilized international relations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/2000/3
5 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have been instructed by my Government to transmit, enclosed herewith, a copy of the letter dated 24 December 1999 from Mr. Assad Kotaite, President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to Mr. Dejan Drobnjaković, Federal Minister of Transport of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex II), and a copy of the letter dated 29 December 1999 from Minister Drobnjaković in response to the said letter (see annex I), relative to the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the determination by ICAO to temporarily suspend a part of the "Air Navigation Plan - European Region" (document 7754) and give the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the authority to promulgate aeronautical information for Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, in contravention of the provision of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) relevant to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In advising you of the unlawful determination of ICAO, I take the opportunity to lodge a strong protest by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), its provision on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex I

Letter dated 29 December 1999 from the Federal Minister of Transport of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 24 December 1999 (see annex II) and to express great surprise and concern on the occasion of the decision of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that the "expedient and pragmatic" solution - but, according to our profound conviction, not a legal one - would be to temporarily suspend a part of the Air Navigation Plan - European Region (document 7754) and give the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the authority to promulgate aeronautical information.

I am convinced that you share our opinion that UNMIK, as an unrecognized organization in the sphere of civil aviation, both legally and operationally, cannot perform the tasks that are within the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nor play the role of aeronautical authority.

We also believe that ICAO is not in a position, only by changing the technical solution for the operation of civil air traffic, to transfer the jobs that are under the direct jurisdiction of a sovereign State - which is what our country is - without its consent, to the jurisdiction of another subject.

You surely recall that ICAO was resolving the problem of the CRAYE point in the same manner, which resulted in a total halt of traffic in that part of the region. A great deal of work on both our parts was necessary to achieve the solution for the re-establishment of air traffic on 27 January 2000. We were certain that we would never be placed in the same situation again.

The international community surely knows that UNMIK cannot guarantee safe flight operations and the present results of flight operations in the airspace over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija are also well known to it. Having that in mind, we are even more surprised by ICAO's decision.

The Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the aeronautical authorities cannot agree with your solution, nor take any responsibility for the safety of air traffic in the region now covered by UMMIK.

Rightfully, we are going to inform the air operators, primarily in the interest of safe flight operations in the region concerned, of our attitude and warn the United Nations that ICAO has taken measures contrary to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

I have to inform you that the reasons for which such an urgent ICAO decision was made are unknown to us.

We take this opportunity to reaffirm our attitude that the most expedient and pragmatic but also the only legal solution for the operation of air traffic

in Kosovo and Metohija is the establishment of the full authority of the civil aeronautical authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this area.

I hope that ICAO, under your leadership, will reconsider once again the justification for the suspension of part of document 7754.

(Signed) Dejan DROBNJAKOVIĆ

Annex II

Letter dated 24 December 1999 from the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization addressed to the Federal Minister of Transport of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 9 December 1999, in which I was seeking your concurrence to delegate the responsibility for the dissemination of aeronautical information for Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). This was done in full recognition of the Air Navigation Plan - European Region (document 7754), wherein Beograd is listed as the official notam office for the Beograd flight information region (FIR). Having received no response from you, I sent a follow-up message on 14 December 1999, expressing the urgency of the situation and asking you kindly to reply not later than 17 December 1999.

On 23 December 1999, I received, through the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Ottawa, a response from you wherein you explained that Kosovo is an integral part of the Beograd FIR and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's civil aviation authorities and their publications are responsible for the safety of air traffic in the area. You also did not agree to the proposal that responsibility for the issuance of aeronautical information relating to Kosovo and the Pristina airport should be delegated to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Given the urgency of the situation, I have taken action to ensure that critical aeronautical information will be made available to the international civil aviation community which must use the Pristina airport. These aircraft operations are in accordance with UNMIK requirements, which are in line with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

Based on the above, it has been determined that the most expedient and pragmatic solution would be to temporarily suspend a part of the Air Navigation Plan - European Region (document 7754) and give UNMIK the authority to promulgate aeronautical information for Kosovo, on a temporary basis, limited to the duration of UNMIK's current mandate under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). I have notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations and UNMIK of this action. Furthermore, I can assure you that this matter will continue to be under my immediate and personal attention and that I will keep you informed of further developments.

(Signed) Assad KOTAITE

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 63
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 3 January 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 30 November 1999 (A/54/642-S/1999/1211), I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 7, 8, 20, 22, 24, 27, 28 and 29 December 1999.

On 7 December, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air traffic regulations. The aircraft in question violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas), before exiting in a south-easterly direction.

On 8 December, two F-16 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air traffic regulations.

On 20 December, one CN-235 as well as one B-200 Turkish aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air traffic regulations. The aircraft in question violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing at 13.28 hours and 13.33 hours respectively at the illegal airport of Tymbou, in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, from which the B-200 departed, at 13.55 hours, returning to the FIR of Ankara, while the CN-235 remained at the airport.

On 22 December, one F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before exiting in a south-easterly direction.

On 24 December, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft departed from the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus and,

after violating the national airspace, exited the Nicosia FIR towards the Ankara FIR.

On 27 December, one C-160 and one Gulfstream Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace. The C-160 flew over the area of Karpasia before exiting in a south-easterly direction. The same aircraft violated the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace later in the same day and, after flying over the area of Karpasia, exited towards the Ankara FIR. The Gulfstream passenger aircraft, after violating the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace, landed at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from which it departed later in the day in the direction of the Ankara FIR.

On 28 December, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air traffic regulations. The aircraft in question violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing at 12.27 hours at the illegal airport of Tymbou, in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, from which it departed, at 14.23 hours, returning to the FIR of Ankara.

On 29 December, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating the national airspace, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting in a south-easterly direction. The same aircraft violated the national airspace once again, later in the day, entering from a south-easterly direction and exiting towards the Ankara FIR.

As stated in my previous letters, these Turkish unauthorized intrusions into the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus are in violation of international air traffic rules and, at the same time, they are in contravention of the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus.

While strongly protesting these provocative acts by Turkey, I wish to underline the need for showing compliance with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions.

Following the recent resumption of proximity talks under your auspices, it is hoped that the necessary positive attitude will be shown and provocations of this nature will end, so that they will not adversely affect the efforts to find a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem, on the basis of United Nations resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotos ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 19
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fifth year

Application of Tuvalu for admission to membership in the United Nations

Note by the Secretary-General

In accordance with rule 135 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith the application of Tuvalu for admission to membership in the United Nations, contained in a letter dated 16 November 1999 from the Prime Minister of Tuvalu to the Secretary-General.

ANNEX

Letter dated 16 November 1999 from the Prime Minister of Tuvalu to the Secretary-General

In accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and with those of rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, I have the honour, on behalf of the Government of Tuvalu and in my capacity as Prime Minister and Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs to request the admission of Tuvalu as a Member of the United Nations.

I would accordingly be grateful if you would arrange for the present application to be placed before the Security Council and the General Assembly for their consideration.

For this purpose, the following declaration is made in pursuance of rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly:

Declaration

In connection with the application by Tuvalu for membership in the United Nations, I have the honour, on behalf of Tuvalu and in my capacity as Prime Minister and Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs, to declare that Tuvalu accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to fulfil them.

(Signed) Ionatana IONATANA
Prime Minister

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S/2000/6
6 January 2000

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LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have been instructed by my Government to transmit its comments on your report on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/1999/1250 and Add.1) of 23 December 1999.

The report gives cause for one overarching concern: the apparent contradiction between the claim that UNMIK has made progress and the facts presented almost throughout the report testifying that the Serbs and other non-Albanians are threatened and that their human rights are being violated. These facts corroborate the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, made clear on many occasions, that the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, is difficult and that its difficulty is being compounded by gross violations of human rights carried out by the members of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the abuse of juveniles and the presence of organized crime, the instances of which were hardly mentioned in the previous report.

Of particular concern is the fact that the provisions of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 continue to be violated. Its express stipulation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not abided by; conditions are not being created for peaceful and normal life; violence continues unabated, particularly against non-Albanians; public law and order are non-existent; no proper border monitoring duties have been established; the provisions on the return of an agreed number of Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and Serbian police personnel have not been implemented; and no secure environment has been created for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

The facts presented throughout the report disprove the claim that UNMIK and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) have carried out their mandate successfully. The establishment of an Interim Administrative Council, the alleged demilitarization of KLA and the setting up of political parties are paper achievements, lip service to a genuine improvement of the situation in the field.

Almost all the instances of the non-implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the non-functioning of institutions in Kosovo and

Metohija are rooted in the existence of security problems, absence of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms for non-Albanians and the commission of serious crimes, such as killings, woundings, abductions, harassment and threats, theft and usurpation of public and private property. Yet, the report has failed to assess blame for the situation and identify the perpetrators and to propose measures to deal with the situation. Although there is abundant evidence in this report (as well as in the reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Amnesty International and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights) that the perpetrators of the atrocities are ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists, that is to say, the members of the so-called KLA or the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), they continue to enjoy the tolerant and benevolent attitude of international presences, and plans are even in place to formally establish KPC by a ceremony in a near future, in contravention of Council resolution 1244 (1999).

The difficult security situation is a direct consequence of the tolerant and benevolent attitude. This is pointed out also in the report by references to "attacks on Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic minorities" which "remained high and continued to be the overriding human rights issue in Kosovo" (para. 2); to "severe restrictions on (the) freedom of movement" of "members of ethnic minorities" (para. 17) and to the enormous magnitude of the ethnic cleansing of Serbs carried out in this Serbian province (in para. 17, it is stated that "in Pristina, the estimated remaining 300 to 600 Kosovo Serbs are frightened to go out and are mostly confined to their homes"); and to the increase in juvenile and organized crimes (paras. 15-19 of the report), of which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has warned frequently in the past.

The security reasons given by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for not "encouraging returns" of Kosovo Serbs (para. 23) are eloquent proof of the gravity of the situation provided by an independent agency, while the reasons invoked (para. 24) for the departure of the Serbs and other non-Albanian groups from Kosovo are just the tip of the iceberg in respect of the atrocities committed against them.

The fact that Serbs are forced to live in enclaves (para. 17) reveals the existence of an obnoxious practice of ghettoization, the most glaring example of which is the situation in the town of Orahovac, a disgrace to the United Nations and its peacekeeping effort on the cusp of the third millennium.

The clearing of 2,700 cluster bombs within the Mine Action Programme (para. 33) is indicative of the use of banned ordnance by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which my Government is in possession of abundant evidence.

Section V.B of the report, on human rights (paras. 70-76), reads as a sorry and sad annals of human rights abuses by ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists against Serbs and other non-Albanians, as well as against their own co-nationals who had the "temerity" to embrace the "wrong side" in the conflict.

However, the allegations that some Albanian prisoners held in Serbia have been released "after paying prison officials or other intermediaries" are untrue and malicious. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives

have visited all prisoners, submitted appropriate reports and informed the families. Accordingly, such claims belong to the realm of speculation, as do the "unconfirmed reports ... that some people may be detained at military installations". They amount to a thinly veiled attempt to balance the blame, as it is widely known that the political leaders of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija and the so-called KLA refuse to cooperate in the search for over 600 Serbs and other non-Albanians who have gone missing since the arrival of the United Nations security and civil presences.

Some of the issues are addressed perfunctorily and no attempt is made to highlight the root causes of the problems. Among them are the non-existence of multi-ethnic hospitals in Kosovo and the problems of education (paras. 38-39), caused primarily by ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists.

UNMIK and KFOR have failed to prevent the so-called KLA from carrying out illegal activities, such as tax and customs duty collection, and issuance of vital records and other certificates (para. 35), which take place on a daily basis and under the watch of the presences, and of which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has warned on more occasions than one.

The professions of contacts and cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (para. 8) are pro forma exercises, designed to mask frequent violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The few contacts and the little cooperation that do exist are fruitless, as the positions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are not respected, while its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its laws and the laws of its constituent Republic of Serbia, are systematically violated.

This is very much in evidence in the sections of the report dealing with questions of civil administration, humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and institution-building which cannot be properly addressed short of cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. It should be pointed out that these authorities are present in Kosovo and Metohija in order to assist in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

On a number of occasions, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has drawn the attention of the Security Council to the regulations of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that are contrary to Council resolution 1244 (1999) and that it considers null and void. Notwithstanding the protestations not only of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also of the Member States of the Security Council, the Special Representative has continued his policy of fait accompli, aimed at driving a wedge between Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia, the Republic of which it is the integral part, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The opening of Pristina airport for commercial traffic, taking control over industrial plants and conglomerates, establishment of the Kosovo Post and Telecommunications (PTK), selection of the bid of a French company, Alcatel, to supply equipment for a Global System for Mobiles (GSM), issuance of separate postage stamps, scheduling of the registration of the residents of Kosovo and Metohija and the intention of carrying out early elections notwithstanding the

fact that there exist no conditions for holding them in the near future, are the most drastic examples of the violations of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), in particular its provision on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations has gone to great lengths to placate ethnic Albanian terrorist separatists. One of the glaring examples is also his readiness to change his regulations to provide for the application of the laws and regulations in existence in Kosovo and Metohija prior to 1989. In doing so, the Special Representative has joined the bandwagon of those who call for the separation of this Serbian province, in wanton disregard of the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council.

The report is silent about the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the laws, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent Republic of Serbia. No mention is made either of the failure to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the military-technical agreement on the return of VJ and Serbian police personnel to Kosovo and Metohija or of the opening of representative offices of foreign countries without consultation and agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is contrary to Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.

Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the Security Council to consider urgently the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and to enjoin UNMIK and KFOR to implement Council resolution 1244 (1999) in its entirety, to create a secure environment for all residents of Kosovo and Metohija and to enable VJ and Serbian police personnel to return to Kosovo and Metohija without delay.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/7
10 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 5 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On 6 August 1990 sweeping sanctions were imposed on Iraq under Security Council resolution 661 (1990). These sanctions, inter alia, prohibited Iraq from exporting goods of any kind and froze its overseas assets, and Iraq was not permitted to obtain funds for the purchase of food and medicine, let alone for the payment of its contributions to the international organizations of which it is a member.

In view of Iraq's inability to pay its contributions in hard currency, given that it does not have the necessary financial resources owing to the comprehensive embargo being maintained against it, the contributions due from it to the budget of the United Nations came to exceed the amount stipulated in Article 19 of the Charter and Iraq was deprived of its right to vote in the General Assembly. The arrears in Iraq's contributions to the budgets of many other international organizations have also mounted, and these organizations include the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In connection with its contributions to the United Nations budget, Iraq has for some years been submitting requests to the Committee on Contributions for exemption from the provisions of Article 19 of the Charter until such time as the sanctions are lifted. Certain States members of the Committee on Contributions, however, have opposed these requests for political reasons. The most recent request Iraq submitted to the Committee on Contributions was that of 19 October 1998 (A/C.5/53/28), which was considered by the Committee at its special session held from 8 to 12 February 1999. In paragraph 64 of its report (A/53/11/Add.1), the Committee states as follows:

> "In addition, there was some discussion of whether the outstanding assessments of Iraq could be met from the sale of Iraqi oil, as was the case with the Compensation Commission and the oil-for-food programme. Some members felt that it would be worth exploring this possibility."

In accordance with this recommendation, on 9 June 1999 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting that consideration be given to the possibility of Iraq's arrears being paid from the revenues derived from Iraqi oil exported under the memorandum of understanding and the oil-for-food programme. In his

letter dated 28 June 1999, the Secretary-General replied that the matter was not within his purview but within that of the Security Council.

In view of the paramount importance that Iraq accords to the payment of the arrears due to the United Nations and to OPEC, we request the Security Council to consider this matter on an urgent basis and to approve the allocation of $24 million from the Iraq Account established pursuant to resolution 986 (1990) and the memorandum of understanding of 20 May 1996, and specifically the 53 per cent and 13 per cent accounts, for the payment of the arrears in Iraq's contributions to the budget of the United Nations ($10 million) and to the OPEC budget ($14 million).

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/8
11 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I write to reconfirm the well-known position of the Republic of Croatia and to register a few additional points on the security issue of the Prevlaka Peninsula, which shall in the coming days be considered by the Security Council under the item entitled "Situation in Croatia".

1. Although Croatia's position on this matter has been explained in our earlier submissions to the Council, I wish to summarize it one more time:

(a) The Prevlaka Peninsula constitutes an integral part of the Republic of Croatia, as evidenced, inter alia, by the map of Herceg Novi-50-6H5-Ja (Basic State Chart, issued by the Federal Geodetic Administration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Titograd/Belgrade, 1970, 1:5000);

(b) The land border at Prevlaka between the former Socialist Republics of Croatia and Montenegro not only existed at the time of the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when Croatia was constituted as an independent State, but was also recognized explicitly as such by the Montenegrin Parliament in October 1991;

(c) Upon the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the borders of its former constituent republics became, on the basis of the relevant rules of international law, frontiers protected by international law. These rules have been confirmed in the relevant Opinions issued by the Arbitration Commission of the European Union/United Nations International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission), which were rendered under the auspices of the Conference upon the initiative of Serbia and Montenegro;

(d) Moreover, in 1992 the Prime Minister and the Head of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed a map of Prevlaka with a line clearly indicating the existing border between the two States and then forwarded it, together with a cover letter containing an explicit pledge to execute the agreement, to the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, and General Satish Nambiar, Commander of the United

Nations Protection Force (S/1999/783, annex I). The reference "Avnojska granica" on the map pertains to the border agreed upon at the Conference of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), held in 1943. The land borders among the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia were agreed to at that Conference. Subsequently, these borders were formalized and honoured in the former Yugoslavia as the borders of its constituent republics, and they have been commonly referred to as "Avnojske granice" ever since;

(e) When confronted with this glaring evidence of the absence of any territorial dispute, as far as the land border is concerned, during the fourth round of bilateral negotiations on the security issue of Prevlaka, held in Belgrade on 9 March 1999, the Yugoslav side questioned the authenticity of signatures of its above-mentioned high officials. The Croatian side has since repeatedly requested, but to no avail, an official response from the Chairman of the Yugoslav delegation and proposed in July 1999 that the next meeting be held in Zagreb during the month of September 1999. The determination of the date of the next meeting was therefore left open, pending the reply of the Yugoslav delegation concerning the authenticity of the signatures;

(f) A courtesy translation of the letter containing such request and proposal, dated 29 July 1999, which was sent by the Head of the Croatian delegation to the Chairman of the Yugoslav delegation, was also forwarded to the United Nations Secretariat on 3 August 1999;

(g) On 19 October 1999, we wrote to the Secretary-General and requested his assistance in authenticating the document in question. My Government appreciates the Secretariat's kind response and their position that they had no reason to believe that the signatures of Prime Minister Panić and General Života Panić were not authentic. We look forward to hearing from the Secretariat, once they have approached the United Nations officials who were involved with this matter at the time, since the confirmation of the authenticity of this document and signatures shall go a long way towards resolving the issue of Prevlaka. We expect the support of the Security Council for this fully justified request.

2. As long as the Yugoslav side refuses to honour its obligations and persists on its quest to alter existing international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia remains deprived of any justifiable basis upon which to proceed with bilateral negotiations on the permanent resolution of the security issue of Prevlaka. The Croatian delegation stands ready to engage in serious negotiations on the future bilateral security regime for Prevlaka and the neighbouring areas of Dubrovnik and the Bay of Kotor, starting from the full respect for existing, internationally recognized border of the Republic of Croatia.

3. The representatives of the Government of Montenegro, one of the two constituent units of the Yugoslav federation, remain unrepresented in the Yugoslav delegation as a result of the refusal of the Government in Belgrade to open the southern border between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely, owing to the deep constitutional crisis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Given that the delimitation at sea has yet to be undertaken, and considering the provisions of the Federal and Montenegrin

constitutions on the question of borders, the absence of the Montenegrin representatives from the Yugoslav delegation renders the legitimacy of any outcome doubtful. Several policy and legal measures that were taken by the international community against high-level Yugoslav federal officials in the past months further compound the existing problems in case of the resumption of bilateral negotiations.

4. In reviewing the most recent communications from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General (S/1999/1278) and to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/1280) pertinent to this matter, I am heartened to learn about the alleged withdrawal of Yugoslav Army units from the Bjelotina site. I cannot help noticing, however, that by this "act of good will" the Yugoslav side has matched, only seven years belatedly, the act of demilitarization that Croatia undertook in 1992 in accordance with agreements reached between the two States.

5. The Republic of Croatia has been on the record all along as stating that the demilitarization of Prevlaka has already contributed and will further contribute to reducing tensions and stabilizing the entire area. The opening and operation of the border crossings at Debeli Brijeg and Konfin in the Prevlaka range resulted in demonstrable confidence-building among the local population from both sides of the international border, while providing the first beachhead of the renewed commercial and other civilian ties between Croatia and Montenegro. Unhindered civilian access throughout the entire Prevlaka range and the opportunity to use the natural resources (fishing and agriculture) would further strengthen stability and confidence in the local population and thus be another important step towards full normalization of relations. This is the right path to proceed on in the future, and one which we hope the members of the Security Council will both fully recognize and effectively support.

I should like to request your kind assistance in distributing the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan ŠIMONOVIĆ
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/9
11 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MALI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the message addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, President of the Republic of Mali, current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on the occasion of the Security Council meeting devoted to the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Moctar OUANE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Message sent from Bamako on 10 January 2000 by His Excellency Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, President of the Republic of Mali, current Chairman of ECOWAS, to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as current Chairman of ECOWAS, I have the pleasure to address to you my very warm congratulations, on behalf of the Governments and peoples of our subregion, for the felicitous initiative that you have taken in devoting a meeting of the Security Council to the consideration of the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa.

This initiative without doubt is making it possible to break the collusive and unacceptable silence which today permits the spread of AIDS. This silence is aggravated by the well-known lack of means which to date have been provided in order to stem this scourge, whose scope and gravity need no further demonstration, as the following figures show:

Of the 33 million persons infected by the AIDS virus throughout the world, 22 million, or 70 per cent, are in sub-Saharan Africa;

Today, there are 8 million AIDS orphans, and five persons are infected with AIDS with each passing minute.

This pandemic is tragically endangering the future of our countries and constitutes even in some regions a factor for economic and social destabilization threatening peace and security in Africa.

In view of this alarming situation, we must organize ourselves from now on in order to wage a crusade against AIDS, in which African leaders must play their responsible role.

I call for a significant increase in the commitment by the international community within the framework of this crusade in order to intensify world research into AIDS, expand prevention and provide the necessary support to the millions of persons affected by HIV/AIDS, particularly, the men, women and children of Africa infected by the pandemic.

Expressing the hope that, beyond the historic step which the Security Council has just taken with regard to enhancing awareness of this pandemic, the current meeting will lead to specific actions which open up the path of hope for all mankind, the path of equitable treatment for all, I wish you complete success in your work.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Alpha Oumar KONARE
President of the Republic
current Chairman of ECOWAS

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/10
13 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
and RUSSIAN

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, 1147 (1998) of 13 January 1998, 1183 (1998) of 15 July 1998, 1222 (1999) of 15 January 1999 and 1252 (1999) of 15 July 1999,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 31 December 1999 (S/1999/1302) on the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP),

Recalling also the letters to its President, from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 24 December 1999 (S/1999/1278) and from the Permanent Representative of Croatia of 10 January 2000 (S/2000/8), concerning the disputed issue of Prevlaka,

Reaffirming once again its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders,

Noting once again the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in particular articles 1 and 3, the latter reaffirming their agreement concerning the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula,

Reiterating its concern about violations of the demilitarization regime, including limitations placed on the free movement of United Nations military observers, while noting some positive development in those fields as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General,

Noting with satisfaction that the opening of crossing points between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro) in the demilitarized zone continue to facilitate civilian and commercial traffic in both directions without security incidents and continue to represent a significant confidence-building measure in the normalization of relations between the two parties, and

urging the parties to utilize these openings as a basis for further confidence-building measures to achieve the normalization of relations between them,

Reiterating its serious concerns about the lack of substantive progress towards a settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in the continuing bilateral negotiations between the parties pursuant to the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 23 August 1996 (S/1996/706, annex), and calling for the resumption of discussions,

Reiterating its call upon the parties urgently to put in place a comprehensive demining programme,

Commending the role played by UNMOP, and noting also that the presence of the United Nations military observers continues to be essential to maintain conditions that are conducive to a negotiated settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka,

1. Authorizes the United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, in accordance with resolutions 779 (1992) and 981 (1995) and paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December (S/1995/1028*), until 15 July 2000;

2. Reiterates its calls upon the parties to cease all violations of the demilitarization regime in the United Nations designated zones, to take steps further to reduce tension and to improve safety and security in the area, to cooperate fully with the United Nations military observers and to ensure their safety and full and unrestricted freedom of movement;

3. Notes with satisfaction that, pursuant to its request in resolution 1252 (1999), the parties have been provided with recommendations and options to develop confidence-building measures, encourages the parties to take concrete steps to implement such recommendations and options with a view to, inter alia, further facilitating the freedom of movement of the civilian population, and requests the Secretary-General to report on the matter by 15 April 2000;

4. Urges once again that the parties abide by their mutual commitments and implement fully the Agreement on Normalization of Relations, and stresses in particular the urgent need for them to fulfil rapidly and in good faith their commitment to reach a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka in accordance with article 4 of the Agreement;

5. Requests the parties to continue to report at least bi-monthly to the Secretary-General on the status of their bilateral negotiations;

6. Requests the United Nations military observers and the multinational stabilization force authorized by the Council in resolution 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996 and extended by resolution 1247 (1999) of 18 June 1999 to cooperate fully with each other;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/54/703
S/2000/11
11 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 43
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 10 January 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the civilian inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place in December 1999.

1 December 1999

Between 0530 and 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 1430 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the westernmost neighbourhood of Arabsalim from the Suwayda hill position. A civilian vehicle was hit.

Between 1520 and 1540 hours Israeli occupation forces fired seven 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas Sribbin and Haddatha from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1715 hours the proxy militia fired four 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of Bra'shit from Ba'lul hill.

At 1825 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit from the Burj hill position.

At 1845 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit from the Ali al-Tahir hill position. A resident's vehicle was damaged.

2 December 1999

Between 0315 and 0430 hours an Israeli gunboat offshore between Mansuri and Sarafand fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0220 and 0545 hours Israeli occupation forces at the Dabshah hill position fired several direct-fire rounds and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around the position and at outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa.

Between 0615 and 0635 hours the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at Mazra'at Uqmata, Mlita hill and areas along the Zahrani River towards Habbush from the Zafatah and Sujud hill positions.

At 0545 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of Bra'shit from Ba'lul hill and Saff al-Hawwa'.

At 0645 hours the collaborators' militia fired three 120-mm mortar shells at an area to the west of Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position.

At 1420 hours the collaborators' militia and Israeli occupation forces fired two 155-mm artillery shells, 11 direct-fire rounds and six 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at areas around and inside Majdal Zun and Mansuri from the Tall Ya'qub, Shama' and Hardun positions. In Majdal Zun and Mansuri several occupied dwellings were hit by shrapnel and badly damaged. The damaged dwellings in Majdal Zun belong to Ali Husayn al-Jabali, Mahmud al-Hajj Abdu Sa'id and Ali Jandal al-Durr, and those in Mansuri belong to Hasan Mahmud Matar, Muhammad Salim Harb, Ibrahim Abbas Harb, Aminah Miladan and Mahmud Yusuf Muhsin.

At 1550 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas Majdal Zun, firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1615 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at the area around Mazra'at al-Hamra from the Zafatah position.

At 1800 hours an Israeli gunboat off Qulaylah and Rashidiyah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions, and occupying Israeli forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm from the position at the Bustan checkpoint.

Between 2000 and 2020 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired several 81-mm mortar shells at areas along the Litani River and outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa from the Sala'ah hill and Dabshah hill positions.

3 December 1999

At 0000 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 0640 and 0710 hours the collaborators' militia at the Jabal Hamid, Ruways, Rshaf and Qawrah positions fired 10 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around its positions and at outlying areas of Yatar.

Between 1745 and 1820 hours an Israeli gunboat offshore between Ra's al-Ayn and Amiriyah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions, and occupation forces fired three 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Adshit al-Qusayr inside the occupied strip from the Tayyibah position.

At 2015 hours the Lahad proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Litani River from the Tall Alman position.

4 December 1999

Between 0445 and 0545 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired at Qusayr and areas along the Litani River from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Tall Ya'qub, Shaqif al-Naml, Bayt Yahun, Ba'lul hill and Sala'ah.

At 0635 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at areas along the Litani River, areas along the Tasah spring and outlying areas of Habbush and Dayr al-Zahrani from the Zafatah position.

At 0645 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the Ayn al-Samahiyah area between Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Mazra'at al-Hamra, firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1010 hours the proxy militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Tasah spring and the Zahrani River from Sujud hill and Suwayda hill.

Between 1425 and 1600 hours Israeli occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Habbush-Arabsalim highway, the outskirts of Habbush, the southernmost neighbourhood of Arabsalim and areas along the Zahrani River from the Shurayfah, Abu Qamhah, Suwayda hill, Sujud hill and Razlan hill positions. A fire broke out and electricity lines were damaged along the Habbush-Arabsalim road.

Between 1520 and 1610 hours the proxy militia fired several 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells at Jabal Basil (between Shihin and Zibqin), Wadi al-Magharah (outside Majdal Silm) and Brak (outside Qantarah) from the Yarin, Sala'ah, Qusayr and Tallusah positions.

At 1825 hours the proxy militia fired two 120-mm mortar shells at areas along the Litani River and outlying areas of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah and Zawtar al-Sharqiyah from the Sala'ah position.

5 December 1999

Between 0000 and 0315 hours two Israeli helicopters overflew the occupied strip. At 0300 hours one of them fired an air-to-surface missile at an outlying area of Mansuri.

Between 0605 and 0625 hours occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 0625 and 0710 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Mazra'at al-Hamra in four waves, firing an air-to-surface missile.

Between 0950 and 0955 hours the proxy militia fired four 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and two direct-fire rounds at outlying areas of Majdal Zun and Mansuri from the Hardun hill and Shama' hill positions.

At 1110 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Tasah spring, the area around Sujud hill and Mazra'at Uqmata from the Sujud hill and Rayhan positions.

Between 1210 and 1225 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

6 December 1999

Between 0000 and 0010 hours the proxy militia fired six 120-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Qasr Ghandur and outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa from the Dabshah hill position.

At 0000 hours the collaborators' militia fired eight 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position.

At 0630 hours occupation forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired a direct-fire round and three 81-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Mansūri from the Radar hill and Hardun hill positions.

Between 1200 and 1330 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa and the South at various altitudes. At 1205 hours they attacked Sujud town, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

Between 2010 and 2045 hours occupying Israeli forces and the proxy militia fired 15 direct-fire rounds (some of them nail-type projectiles) and three 81-mm mortar shells at the Mansuri lowland and outlying areas of Majdal Zun. Two Syrian labourers, Ali Salih al-Khalif and Sulayman Iwad Dughaym, were hit in the body by several pieces of shrapnel, and Mr. Dughaym was also hit in the neck by a nail. One resident, Ahmad Abd Allah al-Dawud of Burghliyah, also died as a result of the shelling.

Between 2255 and 2315 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired several direct-fire rounds, launched illumination flares and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Yuhmur and Kafr Tibnit and the vicinity of the easternmost neighbourhood of Yaham from the positions at Arnun, Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort) and Burj hill. The electricity supply to Kafr Tibnit, Yuhmur and Arnun was disrupted, the exterior walls of two dwellings on the Arnun-Yuhmur road were hit by several direct-fire rounds, and a dwelling in the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit was hit by a number of rounds.

Between 2230 and 2335 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas Tibnin from the Mays al-Jabal position.

7 December 1999

Between 1015 and 1045 hours occupation forces fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at Uqmata and the area around Sujud hill from the Rayhan position.

At 1300 hours the proxy militia fired five 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Mlikh from the Zafatah position.

Between 1825 and 2050 hours occupying Israeli forces and the proxy militia at the Ksarat al-Urush and Burj hill positions fired three 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Mlikh and launched an illumination flare over Burj hill.

At 1930 hours the proxy militia fired two 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Abu Qamhah position.

Between 2000 and 2015 hours an Israeli gunboat off Amiriyah and the Qulaylah lowland launched two illumination flares off the Amiriyah coast and fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions off the Qulaylah lowland.

8 December 1999

At 0010 hours the collaborators' militia fired a 155-mm artillery shell at an outlying area of Yuhmur from the Zafatah position.

Between 0815 and 1415 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at various altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

At 1430 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around Sujud hill and outlying areas of Jarju' from the Sujud hill and Rayhan positions.

At 1635 and 1640 hours Israeli warplanes attacked Jabal al-Rafi' and areas along the Tasah spring, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

9 December 1999

At 0615 hours a clash took place between a Resistance group and a Lahad militia patrol in Rabb al-Thalathin. Two members of the Resistance were killed and their bodies later taken to Udaysah.

Between 0620 and 0640 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired five 155-mm artillery shells and several 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Sawwanah and Tamiriyah and at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the Dahr al-Maydan and Muhaysibat positions as well as from the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 0700 and 0740 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 10 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jumayjimah and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 0830 hours occupation forces fired six 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Qabrikha and at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 0815 and 0910 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Qabrikha, Wadi al-Qaysiyah and areas along the Tasah spring, firing six air-to-surface missiles. The Lahad proxy militia also fired several direct-fire rounds and a number of 120-mm mortar shells at areas along the Tasah spring and Wadi Kafra from the Razlan hill and Rayhan hill positions.

At 0935 hours Israeli occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jba' from the Shurayfah position.

Between 0950 and 1000 hours Israeli occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at the outskirts of Qabrikha from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 1055 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Qabrikha, firing an air-to-surface missile. Window panes were broken in six occupied dwellings belonging to the following: Hasan Najib al-Zayn; Husayn Muhammad Zuhri; Ali Ahmad al-Zayn; Dawud Khalil Fahs; Ali Abbas Mustafa; and Abd Allah Khalil Fahs.

Between 1140 and 1230 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and a number of 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas Qa'qa'iyat al-Jisr, Mayfadun, Tibnin and Bra'shit from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Shurayfah hill, Zafatah, Ba'lul hill and Bayt Yahun.

Between 1550 and 1605 hours elements of the collaborators' militia fired seven 81-mm and 60-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of Bra'shit from Ba'lul hill.

Between 1630 and 1800 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. Between 1730 and 1745 hours they carried out three attacks on areas to the east of Mazra'at Uqmata and the Tall Zunnar slope, firing five air-to-surface missiles. Occupation forces and the proxy militia also fired several 155-mm artillery

shells at Mazra'at Uqmata, outlying areas of Jba' and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Zafatah and Shurayfah.

At 1510 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 12 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah and Wadi al-Saluqi from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 1805 and 1825 hours two Israeli helicopters attacked Tall Arid al-Zunnar and outlying areas of Luwayzah, firing six air-to-surface missiles.

Between 1830 and 1920 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells, 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds at Wadi al-Qaysiyah, Wadi al-Saluqi, Wadi Kafra, Habbush, the outskirts of Jba', outlying areas of Mlikh and Luwayzah, areas along the Tasah spring, the area around Sujud hill, Jabal al-Rafi', Mlita hill and Mazra'at Uqmata from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Shurayfah and Zafatah.

At 1835 hours two Israeli helicopters fired three air-to-surface missiles at areas along the Tasah spring.

Between 1915 and 2130 hours Israeli warplanes carried out attacks on outlying areas of Jba', Mlita hill, the Luwayzah-Mlikh road and Wadi Kafra, firing six air-to-surface missiles. In the artillery bombardment of the outskirts of Jba' two occupied dwellings, belonging to Afif Abbas Hasan Aqil and Samir Qasim Wahbah, were hit by several pieces of shrapnel and the windows of a civilian vehicle were broken.

10 December 1999

At 1920 hours Israeli occupation forces fired several illumination flares at the eastern outskirts of Nabatiyah.

At 2100 hours the Jabal Sujud heights and areas along the Zahrani River came under Israeli artillery fire from the enemy's positions in Zafatah.

11 December 1999

At 0435 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions and launched three illumination flares over the shore.

At 0535 hours the proxy militia fired four 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun from the Shama' position.

At 0625 hours the proxy militia fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Zahrani River, outlying areas of Shukin and the southernmost neighbourhood of Arabsalim from the Suwayda hill position. One 81-mm mortar shell impacted in the yard of Hasan Yunis Makki's home in Habbush and he was hit by several pieces of shrapnel.

At 0650 hours the proxy militia fired seven 81-mm and 120-mm shells at outlying areas of Mansuri and Majdal Zun from the Shama' and Hardun positions.

At intervals between 0950 and 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the North, Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa and the South at very high altitudes. An Israeli reconnaissance aircraft also overflew the Hirmil area at very high altitude.

At 1740 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at the area around Sujud hill from the Razlan hill position.

Between 1650 and 1950 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa at very high altitudes.

At 1500 and 1510 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the Ksarat al-Urush and Jabal al-Rafi' vicinity, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

Between 1500 and 1545 hours the proxy militia fired several 81-mm mortar shells and 155-mm artillery shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around Sujud hill, Bayt Yahun, outlying areas of Haddatha and Bra'shit from the Ba'lul hill, Shaqif al-Naml, Bayt Yahun and Zafatah positions.

12 December 1999

Between 0000 and 0020 hours the collaborators' militia fired 16 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Tiri, Haddatha and Shaqra from the Shaqif al-Naml, Ruwaysat al-Jamus, Hula and Shal'abun positions.

Between 0630 and 0645 hours occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah from the Shurayfah position.

At 1320 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas Yatar from the Bayt Lif position.

Between 1630 and 1655 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired four 120-mm mortar shells at Harbayya hill from the Ayn Qinya position and 10 more at the Mimis ridge from Zaghlah hill. It also directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the same locality.

At 1815 hours occupying Israeli forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 1835 hours a direct-fire round fired from the occupied strip impacted in the wadi between Bisri and Kafr Milki.

At 2000 hours occupying Israeli forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas Majdal Zun and Izziyah from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 2110 hours several 120-mm mortar shells fired from the occupied strip fell in outlying areas of Jba'.

At 2115 hours the Lahad proxy militia at the Ruways position directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around the position itself.

At 1740 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1855 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire towards the sea from the Bayyadah position.

At 1900 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Shuriyah and Sujud hill from the Rayhan and Qusayr positions.

Between 2030 and 2045 hours the proxy militia fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of Bra'shit and outlying areas of Haddatha and Tibnin from the Ba'lul hill, Bayt Yahun and Shaqif al-Naml positions.

13 December 1999

For unknown reasons, at 0700 hours the Lahad proxy militia in Arnun arrested three persons, Muhammad Ali Maruni, Ali Ahmad Tawbah and Mahmud Ali Assaf, and took them off in the direction of Marj Uyun. At 1345 hours it released all of them, together with all those arrested on 23 November except for the woman called Shamlakan. They remained in their town.

At 0645 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the area around Sujud hill and areas along the Tasah spring from the Zafatah position.

At 0700 hours the collaborators' militia fired nine 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position. A 120-mm mortar shell fired from the militia's position at Zafatah impacted some 50 metres from the home of Yusuf Ali Haydar in the southernmost neighbourhood of Arabsalim, breaking the window panes.

At 1630 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired three direct-fire rounds and four 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun and Mansuri from the Radar, Shama' and Hardun positions.

14 December 1999

Between 0530 and 0600 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Zahrani River towards Habbush from the Suwayda hill position.

Between 0600 and 0655 hours the proxy militia fired several 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Yatar, Rshaf, Haddatha and Tibnin from the Shaqif al-Naml, Bayt Yahun, Rshaf and Bayt Lifa positions.

Between 1440 and 1510 hours Israeli warplanes attacked areas along the Tasah spring in two waves, firing three air-to-surface missiles.

At 1855 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Nabatiyah vicinity and the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit from the Burj hill and Ali al-Tahir positions. In Nabatiyah Hanan Abd al-Wahhab Andris (an Ethiopian woman) was hit by a 12.7-mm round.

At 2015 hours occupation forces at Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort) fired several 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Litani River and the Yuhmur vicinity.

Between 2105 and 2200 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi al-Fatir from the Ayn Qinya and Zimriya positions.

15 December 1999

Between 0005 and 0500 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi al-Fatir from the two Ayn Qinya positions.

At 0330 hours the proxy militia fired three 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position.

At 0530 and 1000 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Shu'aytiyah, Jibal al-Butm, Haddatha, Bra'shit, Bayt Yahun, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Qa'qa'iyat al-Jisr, Mayfadun, Shukin, Mazra'at al-Hamra, Wadi al-Qaysiyah, Mazra'at Uqmata, areas along the Zahrani River and the area around Sujud hill from the positions at Sujud hill, Rayhan, Aramta, Dabshah hill, Tahrah hill, Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort), Zafatah, Shurayfah, Tayyibah, Ba'lul hill, Ruways, Bayt Yahun, Hardun, Radar, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and Tall Ya'qub. An 81-mm mortar shell impacted on the road to Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and damaged a vehicle and wounded the driver, Ali Ahmad Hurqus. In an outlying area of Bayt Yahun one woman, Turkiyah Baydun, was so badly wounded that she was taken to Israel.

At 0945 hours the proxy militia at the Zimriya crossing position directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire in the direction of the crossing itself.

At 1015 hours Israeli warplanes attacked Jabal Jabbur, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

Between 1010 and 1110 hours Israeli warplanes attacked Sujud town, Mlita hill, areas along the Tasah spring and outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Shu'aytiyah, firing five air-to-surface missiles. The schools in Marj Uyun and Rayhan were closed. In Mayfadun four occupied dwellings were hit by several pieces of shrapnel, namely those of Ali Yasin Jawad, Malik Muhammad Ali Jabir, Yusuf Ali Jabir and Ra'uf Shuhuri.

Between 2030 and 2100 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Tasah spring and the outskirts of Jarju' from the Shurayfah and Sujud hill positions.

At 1700 hours in Arnun a patrol of the Lahad proxy militia's security service arrested Ibrahim Muhammad Assaf and Husayn Ali Assaf (father of the Shamlakan Assaf arrested on 23 November).

16 December 1999

At 0240 hours Israeli occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Zibqin and Jibal al-Butm from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 0330 and 0620 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions and occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Zibqin and Jibal al-Butm from the position at the Bustan checkpoint.

Between 0620 and 0700 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 15 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah and outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Shaqra and Jumayjimah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 0430 and 0445 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the Yuhmur lowland from the Zafatah position.

Between 0600 and 0720 hours the collaborators' militia fired four direct-fire rounds and five 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Mansuri and Majdal Zun from the Shama' positions.

Between 0730 and 0735 hours the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the Yuhmur lowland from the Zafatah position.

At 0940 hours the collaborators' militia fired four 120-mm mortar shells, two of which landed in areas along the Tasah spring while the others impacted in the yard at the Arabsalim school. Fifteen pupils at the school received miscellaneous injuries from broken glass and shrapnel. They included: Ali Yusuf Hamud, 12; Malak Husayn Shams al-Din, 13; Mahmud Husayn Hasan Musa, 11; Muna Adnan Shararah, 9; Ali Ahmad Safadiyah, 9; Muhammad Husayn Nadhr, 12; Husayn Fayyad Harb, 13; Marawi Husayn Hasan, 8; Hanan Muhammad Musa, 10; Hasan Hamzah Sa'adah, 12; Rabab Ahmad Fahs, 12; Ali Mahmud Shararah, 4; and Husayn Muhammad Harb, 12. Slightly injured were Muna Farhat, Ahmad Hasan, Muhammad Ali Farhat and Ali Ahmad Safadiyah.

Between 1350 and 1550 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 10 155-mm artillery shells and five 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas Mayfadun, Zibqin, Jibal al-Butm and Majdal Zun from the positions at Shurayfah, Tall Ya'qub and the Bustan checkpoint.

At 1950 hours the proxy militia fired four 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Rafi' from the Rayhan position.

17 December 1999

Between 0340 and 0500 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

Between 0330 and 0445 hours Israeli occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells, 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Jarju', the area around Sujud hill and areas along the Tasah spring from the Shurayfah, Zafatah and Sujud hill positions.

Between 1100 and 1120 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the coastal area of the Shuf, Zgharta, Bsharri, Kurah, Batrun and the Bekaa at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1100 and 1250 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Sidon area and the Western Bekaa at very high altitudes.

Between 1135 and 1215 hours the collaborators' militia fired four direct-fire rounds and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Frun and Zibqin from the Shihin position.

At 2255 hours occupation forces fired a 155-mm artillery shell at an outlying area of Jibal al-Butm from the Tall Ya'qub position.

18 December 1999

Between 0430 and 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0650 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of Majdal Zun from the Tallusah position.

Between 2125 and 2135 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around the Tallusah position from the position itself.

19 December 1999

At intervals between 0430 and 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0645 hours the proxy militia fired seven 120-mm mortar shells at the Jabal Jabbur vicinity from Ahmadiyah hill.

Between 1455 and 1535 hours the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at Sujud hill from the Sujud hill, Rayhan and Zafatah positions.

At 2025 hours the collaborators' militia fired two direct-fire rounds at an outlying area of Majdal Zun from the Shama' position.

Between 2250 and 2345 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. At 2300 and 2325 hours they attacked the area around Sujud hill and Mazra'at Uqmata, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

20 December 1999

At 0000 hours Israeli warplanes attacked an area to the west of Jabal Jabbur, firing an air-to-surface missile, and the collaborators' militia fired five 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah position.

Between 0430 and 0630 hours an Israeli gunboat offshore between Qulaylah and Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0535 and 0550 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

At 0555 hours Israeli warplanes attacked an area to the west of Jabal Jabbur, firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1900 hours the collaborators' militia and occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Tasah spring, at outlying areas of Kafr Rumman, Habbush and Arabsalim and at the area around Suwayda hill from the Razlan hill, Suwayda hill, Dabshah hill and Zafatah positions. The Arid al-Hawwa vicinity, under the 123rd Battalion, also came under medium-weapons fire from Suwayda hill.

21 December 1999

Between 1820 and 1900 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun fire in all directions.

22 December 1999

During the day elements of the Lahad proxy militia's security service in Shab'a arrested Fadi Murshid Dahir.

At 1000 hours the proxy militia arrested Ahmad Abd al-Hamid Surur in Atya al-Sha'b in the occupied strip and took him to Khiyam prison.

Between 1440 and 1445 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa at very high altitudes.

At 1510 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around the Zimriya crossing from the Zimriya position.

23 December 1999

Between 0305 and 0400 hours the collaborators' militia fired 20 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Khalawat and Qa'qur hill from the Zaghlah and Abu Qamhah positions and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi al-Fatir, the Mimis ridge and Jabal Bir al-Dahr from Zimriya hill.

At 0430 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri stopped the fishing boat Duha (No. 1270) with Khalil Ali Darmist and his brother Abbas on board. They were taken off in a westerly direction.

At 1015 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Batrun area at very high altitudes.

In Ayta al-Sha'b the Lahad proxy militia arrested Murtada al-Sayyid Muhsin Murtada and took him to Khiyam prison.

At 1935 hours occupying Israeli forces at Dabshah hill directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and the area around the hill itself.

At 1820 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions and launched three illumination flares over the sea off the same coast.

Between 2045 and 2100 hours the collaborators' militia at the Tahrah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions fired several 81-mm mortar shells and two direct-fire rounds at the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah and at areas around the hills themselves.

Between 2200 and 2230 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at very high altitude.

24 December 1999

At 0000 hours the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the area around Sujud hill and areas along the Tasah spring from the Zafatah and Sujud hill positions.

Between 1040 and 1105 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1155 and 1240 hours occupation forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells, direct-fire rounds and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah, Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Yatar, Wadi al-Kafur and areas along the Zahrani River from the Tall Ya'qub, Bayyadah, Shama' and Zafatah positions.

Between 1355 and 1530 hours occupying Israeli forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Qusayr, areas along the Tasah spring, Wadi Habbush, Wadi al-Qaysiyah, Arabsalim and outlying areas of Mansuri and Majdal Zun from the positions at Zafatah, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Ksarat al-Urush, Sala'ah and Ba'lul hill.

Between 1650 and 1740 hours occupation forces fired 21 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Shu'aytiyah, Zibqin, Majdal Zun and Mansuri from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1745 hours an Israeli gunboat off Rashidiyah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 1755 and 1845 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. At 1815 and 1830 hours they attacked outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Shu'aytiyah, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

25 December 1999

Between 1325 and 1345 hours there was an exchange of automatic-weapons fire between a joint proxy militia/Israeli occupation forces patrol and Resistance elements near the Kafr Hunah triangle. Resistance member Bilal Mulhim al-Bazzal was killed.

Between 1345 and 1430 hours the proxy militia fired 25 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal Jabbur and the areas round about from the Abu Qamhah position.

At 1415 hours Israeli warplanes attacked Jabal Jabbur, firing an air-to-surface missile.

Between 1500 and 1600 hours occupation forces fired eight 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Izziyah and Majdal Zun from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 2125 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jba' from the Shurayfah and Abu Qamhah positions.

During the day the Lahad militia arrested Mazin Murshid Khasir, Arafat Sa'b and Khalid Mahmud, all of them from Shab'a, and took them to Khiyam prison.

26 December 1999

At 0700 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around the Suwayda hill position and areas along the Zahrani River from the position itself.

At 1620 hours the proxy militia fired three 155-mm artillery shells at areas along the Zahrani River from the Zafatah position.

Between 1950 and 2200 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and six 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah, Mazra'at al-Hamra, Haddatha, Tiri and Majdal Silm from the Zafatah, Ruwaysat al-Jamus, Hula, Tall Ya'qub and Shaqif al-Naml positions.

27 December 1999

Between 0000 and 0100 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at very high altitude.

At 0445 hours an Israeli gunboat off Ra's al-Ayn fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0630 and 0700 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired 15 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haris and Haddatha from the Qawzah and Shaqif al-Naml positions.

Between 0850 and 0905 hours the proxy militia fired four 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha from the Ruways position.

Between 1430 and 1450 hours the proxy militia fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haddatha and Bra'shit from the Ruways, Shaqif al-Naml, Ba'lul hill and Bayt Yahun positions.

Between 1940 and 2030 hours the proxy militia and occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Shaqra, Yatar, Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Tall Ya'qub, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and Hula.

28 December 1999

Between 1400 and 1445 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi al-Hujayr from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 1420 and 1500 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. At 1455 hours they attacked the area around Mazra'at al-Hamra and areas along the Litani River towards Shuriyah, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

Between 0615 and 0625 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Tasah spring and the outskirts of Jarju' from the Sujud hill position.

At 1030 hours the proxy militia at the Zimriya crossing position directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around the crossing itself.

During the day Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Jba' and Kafr Fila and Wadi Kafra. In an outlying area of Kafr Fila window panes in three occupied dwellings - those of Hasan Muhammad Rashid, Yahya Hammadah and Husayn Ahmad Hamdan - were broken.

29 December 1999

Between 0530 and 0540 hours the collaborators' militia fired six 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position.

Between 1200 and 1310 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa, the North, Mount Lebanon and the South at very high altitudes, breaking the

sound barrier. An Israeli reconnaissance aircraft also overflew the area to the east of Tyre at very high altitude.

At 0715 hours the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Habbush and Arabsalim and at areas along the Zahrani River from the Zafatah and Suwayda hill positions.

At 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa at moderate altitudes.

Between 1345 and 1530 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 10 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah and outlying areas of Sawwanah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 1410 and 1600 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells, 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Zibqin, Jibal al-Butm, Shu'aytiyah, Jba', Wadi Kafra, areas along the Tasah spring, the area around Sujud hill, Jabal Safi and Mlita hill from the Sujud, Razlan, Rajmin, Shama', Tall Ya'qub, Zafatah and Rayhan positions.

Between 1500 and 1600 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. At 1530 and 1535 hours they attacked outlying areas of Jba' and the Jabal Safi vicinity, firing three air-to-surface missiles.

At 1435 hours the collaborators' militia fired 17 120-mm mortar shells at the area around Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position.

At 1800 hours Israeli occupation forces fired five 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Shu'aytiyah, Zibqin, Yatar and Jibal al-Butm from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 2130 and 2140 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia at Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort), Tahrah hill, Dabshah hill and Suwayda hill directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Kafr Rumman and Mayfadun and at areas around the positions themselves.

At 2200 hours occupation forces fired six 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Zibqin and Mansuri from the Tall Ya'qub position.

30 December 1999

At 0100 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and direct-fire rounds at outlying areas of Mayfadun from Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort) and Zafatah.

Between 0500 and 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0655 and 0715 hours Israeli occupation forces fired 10 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Zibqin, Jibal al-Butm and Shu'aytiyah from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 0850 and 0925 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired five 155-mm artillery shells and four 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Yatar and Haddatha from the Tall Ya'qub and Ruwaysat al-Jamus positions.

31 December 1999

Between 0645 and 0710 hours the proxy militia fired 11 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the Ahmadiyah hill position.

At 1120 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa at very high altitudes.

Between 1220 and 1235 hours Israeli occupation forces fired two 155-mm artillery shells and two 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas Zibqin and Majdal Zun from the position at the Bustan checkpoint.

Between 1440 and 1530 hours the Lahad proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Mansuri and Majdal Zun from the Shama' and Hardun positions.

At 1915 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Habbush, Ali al-Tahir, the area around Qasr Ghandur and abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah and outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and Kafr Tibnit from the Dabshah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation and the fresh attacks and arbitrary practices against the Lebanese civilian population that have left a number of dead and wounded and have caused further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sélim TADMOURY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 11 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States and British aircraft based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey continued between 1 and 8 January 2000 and that the aircraft in question engaged in acts of aggression, reconnaissance activities and acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the facilities for these acts of aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

These actions are continuing to bring death and injury to hundreds of civilians and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The logistic support that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey provide to the United States and British forces makes them key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they share international responsibility for the consequences of these actions. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek lawful compensation for the damage being inflicted on its people by these same actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations by United States and British aircraft and damage caused, 1-8 January 2000

1. In the northern region 14 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

At 1205 hours on 7 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1320 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 161 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1100 hours on 2 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 62 missions, 16 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 46 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Safwan, Basrah, Qurnah, Artawi, Lasaf, Taqtaqanah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Hayy, Rifa'i, Salman and Ushbayjah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1205 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1150 hours on 3 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 28 missions, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 14 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Ushbayjah, Lasaf, Artawi, Busayyah, Jalibah, Salman, Basrah, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shatrah, Qal'at Sukkar and Shinafiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1300 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 0905 hours on 4 January 2000 United States and British F-14 and F-15 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out six missions, four of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and two from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Umm Qasr, Artawi, Ushbayjah and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1020 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 0715 hours on 5 January 2000 United States and British F-14 and F-15 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out four missions from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Salman, Ushbayjah and Taqtaqanah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0815 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 0830 hours on 7 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado, EA-6B and remotely piloted aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 23 missions, 13 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 10 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Salman, Basrah, Amarah, Jalibah, Qurnah, Artawi and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0945 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1030 hours on 8 January 2000 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 38 missions, 26 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 12 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Salman, Basrah, Amarah, Jalibah, Qurnah, Artawi and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1335 hours, drove them off.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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11 January 2000

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SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1270 (1999) ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 26 of its resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999, the Security Council requested me to report every 45 days to provide updates on the status of the peace process, on security conditions on the ground and on the continued level of deployment of personnel of the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG). The present report is the second submitted pursuant to that request and covers developments since the previous report, dated 6 December 1999 (S/1999/1223).

2. In my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 23 December 1999 (S/1999/1285), I informed the Council that Nigeria had decided to repatriate Nigerian troops participating in ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. In that letter I also recommended that the Council authorize, as soon as possible, the expansion of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and that the mandate of the Mission be broadened to enable it to assume functions now performed by ECOMOG. At informal consultations held on 29 December, members of the Council discussed the recommended changes to the mandate and strength of UNAMSIL in view of the withdrawal of ECOMOG and requested the Secretariat to provide it with further detailed information as soon as possible. Pursuant to that request, the present report contains an elaboration of the proposed mandate and concept of operations for an expanded UNAMSIL as well as its force strength and composition.

II. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS

Political developments

3. During the last week of December and the first week of January, the situation in Sierra Leone went through a difficult period as ECOMOG continued its withdrawal from several key locations in the provinces and the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) challenged the implementation of some of the aspects of the peace process. The resulting serious tensions subsided somewhat with the deployment of UNAMSIL troops to the countryside, including Makeni and Magburaka,

which are under RUFP control. The accelerated deployment of UNAMSIL troops has also helped to restore public calm, and it is hoped that this has opened the way for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, free movement of the civilian population and the restoration of civil authority.

4. On 29 December 1999, at a press conference in Freetown, Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUFP presented a position paper on alleged violations of the Lomé Peace Agreement. In it RUFP criticized the Government and the international community for not providing the financial resources necessary to allow RUFP participation in various ceasefire monitoring mechanisms or the transformation of the Revolutionary United Front into a political party. In the paper, RUFP also expressed concerns about the mandate and strength of UNAMSIL and stated that the Party would not allow the deployment of UNAMSIL in areas under its control until the district-level ceasefire monitoring committees were in place. In a letter dated 4 January 2000 addressed to me, Mr. Sankoh reiterated some of his concerns, but also emphasized his commitment to the full implementation of the Lomé Agreement and indicated that RUFP had no objections to the establishment and deployment of UNAMSIL.

5. The Government, for its part, published a comprehensive reply to the RUFP paper, which defended the mandate of UNAMSIL and confirmed President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's support for the speedy deployment of UNAMSIL throughout the country. On 31 December, after intensive discussions, the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, chaired by President Kabbah, decided that the deployment of UNAMSIL should proceed immediately and that the Government would find a way to establish ceasefire monitoring committees in various parts of the country and to allow the participation of RUFP representatives in them. Subsequently, despite initial obstruction by some Revolutionary United Front elements on the ground, the deployment was completed successfully at Makeni, Magburaka, Daru, Port Loko complex, Lungi and parts of Freetown.

6. Following a decision by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Mr. Sankoh, Deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman and the ECOMOG Force Commander visited the areas of Bo and Kenema as part of an effort to build confidence and awareness and to encourage the disarmament of ex-combatants in those areas. However, few have come forward to disarm.

7. My Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, assumed his functions in Freetown on 11 December.

Security situation

8. During the reporting period, the security situation remained precarious. On 6 December a Revolutionary United Front commander, Sam Bockarie, detained two staff members of Médecins sans frontières in Buedu. This incident was resolved peacefully with the assistance of UNAMSIL and regional leaders; the hostages were released unharmed on 16 December. The situation in the Eastern Province, in particular the Kailahun area, calmed down after Mr. Bockarie left the country on 18 December. Since his departure, it would appear that all or most

Revolutionary United Front commanders in the Northern and Eastern Provinces have now reaffirmed their commitment to RUFP leader Sankoh.

9. Serious concerns remain about the rising level of lawlessness and banditry, especially in and around Freetown and in the areas of Lungi and Port Loko. Many ceasefire violations and incidents of civilian harassment appear to have been committed by former Sierra Leonean army elements based in the Occra Hills region. In addition, there were reported attempts to smuggle weapons to Freetown, which prompted the Government and ECOMOG to take supplementary security measures. At the same time, security deteriorated in several disarmament centres (see paras. 11 and 12 below). However, citing some improvement in security conditions in the capital, the Government deemed it possible to shorten for two hours the existing curfew in Freetown.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants

10. Progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has generally been very slow, presumably as the various groups have been assessing the evolving situation, as well as the deployment of UNAMSIL and repatriation of ECOMOG troops. Efforts are now under way by the Government and its external partners to increase the capacity of the various disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites, especially in the Makeni/Magburaka area. At the same time, the drawdown of ECOMOG in Daru led to the dismantling of one reception area for disarmament. As at 10 January, there were more than 6,000 ex-combatants present in disarmament centres. In a message dated 6 January, President Kabbah indicated that the often-claimed figure of 45,000 combatants might be "an overestimation".

11. The very slow pace of demobilization is compounded by continuing unrest among ex-combatants in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps at Lungi and Port Loko. The payment of the first tranche of $150 of their allowances bought temporary calm at the end of December. However, the discharge of ex-combatants from the camps has been delayed as a result of logistical problems, including the preparation of identification cards, which the Government, together with its external partners, will have to address urgently. There is also concern that a large number of discharged ex-combatants may move into Freetown owing to the continued lack of access to other parts of the country, thus further increasing the level of insecurity. In addition, the various armed groups have yet to come forward with the required information about their military strength.

12. On 3 January about 100 former combatants in Port Loko tried to attack the UNAMSIL office at the local disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp, but were stopped by ECOMOG security guards who fired warning shots. Four ex-combatants and two civilians were wounded during the unrest, and a few United Nations vehicles were slightly damaged. On 9 January several ex-combatants attacked a Nigerian UNAMSIL officer in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp in Lungi.

13. On 4 January the Government decided to relocate all Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) combatants to the vacated ECOMOG barracks at Mile 91. This proposal was developed in cooperation with the AFRC leader,

Johnny Paul Koroma, to improve control over AFRC elements in Freetown and the Occra Hills through their transfer to a central location where they would be screened for service in a restructured Sierra Leonean army and, if ineligible, would be registered for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Mile 91 camp will also serve as the training facility for those accepted back into military service. Preparations for the implementation of the proposal are currently under way.

14. On 22 December the World Bank announced a contribution of $25 million for a community reintegration and rehabilitation project in Sierra Leone. The aim of this project is to help reintegrate ex-combatants and to rebuild the social and economic infrastructure. The Bank also decided to establish its presence in Sierra Leone.

Presence of the Miliary Observer Group

15. During the reporting period ECOMOG continued to withdraw its troops from various locations in the country, including Lungi, Port Loko, Lunsar, Masiaka, Mile 91, Mano, and Daru. ECOMOG, which at present has a strength of about 4,729 troops, retains positions in Freetown, Rogberi Junction, Zimmi, Mano Junction and several other locations.

16. On 23 December the Secretariat held discussions at United Nations Headquarters with a high-level Nigerian delegation on the incorporation of Nigerian units in UNAMSIL as well as on the modalities of withdrawing Nigerian troops from ECOMOG. The discussions resulted in an understanding that Nigeria and the United Nations would work together closely to avoid any security gap in Sierra Leone and that Nigeria and the Secretariat would coordinate the deployment of troops to and the repatriation of troops from Sierra Leone and would also discuss, in due course, the participation of Nigeria in an expanded UNAMSIL.

Deployment of the Mission

17. On 7 December the Force Commander, Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, assumed command of the military component of UNAMSIL. The present military strength is 4,819 (see annex), with five of the six authorized battalions now deployed in Sierra Leone. At present UNAMSIL is deployed in the Freetown peninsula, at Lungi airport and its vicinity and in Port Loko, Lunsar, Masiaka, Makeni, Magburaka, Kenema and Daru.

Human rights

18. The human rights situation in Sierra Leone improved somewhat during the last week of December, although sporadic attacks on civilians in the Port Loko area continued. Ambushes against villages and civilian traffic in this area involved looting, rape, abduction and in some instances summary execution. However, following the establishment of UNAMSIL patrols along the Lungi-Port Loko road, the number of reported incidents in those areas decreased.

19. There were no noteworthy releases of abductees during the reporting period, in spite of efforts by the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and

Non-Combatants chaired by UNAMSIL. On 22 December the Committee issued a press release drawing attention to the lack of progress in this area and appealing to the leadership of RUFP and AFRC to ensure the release of all abducted persons without further delay.

20. On 29 December, UNAMSIL, acting on behalf of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, submitted to the Government the draft statute for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, developed by independent experts with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Government is currently reviewing the text with a view to the speedy establishment of the Commission. The United Nations is also providing technical assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone with regard to the creation of an independent Human Rights Commission, as called for by the Lomé Agreement. A draft statute is being prepared and will be submitted to the Government in late January.

Humanitarian aspects

21. As the result of a good harvest, the humanitarian situation has somewhat improved in some parts of country, but remains poor in the Northern Province, where about 2.6 million civilians have been without sufficient access to relief for months or, in some cases, years. Humanitarian agencies in Revolutionary United Front/AFRC areas were again forced to scale back their operations after Revolutionary United Front combatants detained two aid workers in Kailahun in early December. Although they were released unharmed, the abductions led to the suspension of medical services in the area and again delayed deployment to other parts of the country.

22. In accessible areas, however, humanitarian programmes have continued to make good progress. New food distribution efforts were undertaken in the towns of Port Loko and Kabala to respond to evolving humanitarian emergencies. Further, the Government and former rebel groups on 30 December reopened roads in the Eastern Province that had been closed for years, linking the major towns of Kenema, Koidu, Kono and Kailahun.

III. MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF AN EXPANDED MISSION

23. As indicated in my previous reports to the Security Council, the establishment and maintenance of security in the country is an essential condition for the success of the peace process in Sierra Leone. Security is indispensable for the successful execution of the programme of disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, which could remove a threat to the stability of the country and, at the same time, facilitate the restoration of a measure of normalcy to social and economic life in Sierra Leone. Security is also necessary to implement the political and human rights-related provisions of the Lomé Agreement and to ensure humanitarian assistance throughout the country.

24. The presently authorized strength of UNAMSIL of up to 6,000 military personnel was considered sufficient for assisting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and creating an acceptable level of security in the country in conjunction with a strong ECOMOG presence. For the

time being, the Sierra Leonean army, which has yet to be restructured, retrained and equipped, is unable to contribute in a substantial manner to national security. Now that ECOMOG has decided to repatriate its troops, there appears to be no alternative to expanding UNAMSIL in order to keep the peace process in Sierra Leone on track.

25. Nevertheless, it is clear that the United Nations will not be able to maintain a major military presence in Sierra Leone for a prolonged period of time. The Government of Sierra Leone and its bilateral partners should therefore develop, as a priority, a credible and reliable mechanism to ensure national security and thereby decrease its dependence on outside assistance. For the time being, however, the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leonean armed forces, as provided for in the Lomé Agreement, as well as the training of the police, will require important support from the international community. I appeal to the donor community to make the necessary contributions to those ends.

Mandate

26. In my letter of 23 December (S/1999/1285) it was proposed that the UNAMSIL mandate be broadened to enable it to assume functions now being performed by ECOMOG, in particular the provision of security at Lungi airport and at key installations, buildings and government institutions in and around Freetown. It should be underscored, however, that these tasks would not fundamentally change the nature of the mandate, which is based on the requirement in article XVI of the Lomé Agreement for a neutral peacekeeping force (see S/1999/777, annex). The main focus of UNAMSIL activities in Sierra Leone, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1270 (1999), would obviously continue to be cooperation with the Government and other parties in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement and the provision of assistance to the Government in carrying out the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan for ex-combatants.

27. In addition to the crucial functions described above, UNAMSIL would also have to be able to assume other tasks that are currently assigned to ECOMOG. Such tasks would include guarding the weapons and ammunition retrieved during the disarmament process and assisting in their destruction, as well as helping the Government, within the limits of its mandate, to recover illegal arms, a task that would remain essentially a national responsibility. The expanded force would also contribute to the free circulation of people and goods and the delivery of humanitarian assistance along selected key roads and perform other functions as described below. It is understood that, in accordance with its present mandate as contained in resolution 1270 (1999), UNAMSIL would continue, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government.

Concept of operations

28. UNAMSIL would essentially be expected to continue to function with the cooperation of the parties. However, to achieve the objectives of the Lomé Agreement, it would be important that UNAMSIL, through its military presence, military capabilities and posture, be able to deter attempts to derail the peace

process. In addition to its current mandate under resolution 1270 (1999), the proposed concept of UNAMSIL operations would include the following elements:

(a) Establishing a substantial presence at key locations and government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport;

(b) Providing additional security at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites and guarding and destroying weapons and ammunition collected from ex-combatants;

(c) Conducting extensive mobile patrols, in particular throughout Freetown and in the vicinity of UNAMSIL fixed positions throughout the country;

(d) Conducting frequent patrols and, if necessary, providing armed escorts on important roads to ensure the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along main thoroughfares;

(e) Affirming, when necessary, through the deployment of the UNAMSIL rapid reaction element, the commitment of the United Nations to the peace process;

(f) Maintaining adequate reserves to ensure flexibility and sufficient reaction capabilities and reinforcing its positions or patrols when necessary;

(g) Maintaining close coordination with the Sierra Leonean law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities.

29. Following a thorough assessment by UNAMSIL of the security situation throughout the country, a sizeable and militarily credible United Nations force would be required to accomplish these objectives, most of which were initially part of the mandate of ECOMOG. The expanded United Nations force would therefore require up to 11,100 military personnel, including 260 military observers, 12 infantry battalions, force and sector headquarters personnel, 2 military engineer companies, adequate medical personnel and facilities, communications and transport units, a helicopter and aviation element and other military support elements. It is envisaged that most battalions would be largely self-sustaining, with any additional logistical support being provided by civilian contractors. This arrangement has become necessary, given that extensive efforts to identify a Member State willing to contribute a military logistic support unit have been unsuccessful.

30. The increase in the number of infantry battalions from 6 to 12 would make it necessary to establish sectoral command and control structures, which would require approximately 200 military personnel each. The required engineering companies would engage in demining and repair of essential roads, bridges and camp facilities. The infantry battalions would also be supplied with the necessary night vision and communication equipment.

31. The force would be deployed in four sectors, each of which would include important population centres and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, as well as vital communication lines. These four sectors would be the Freetown peninsula (three battalions plus support elements), the Lungi/Port

Loko area (three battalions), the Makeni/Magburaka/Koidu area (three battalions) and the Bo/Kenema/Kailahun area (three battalions). In particular, each battalion would be assigned to the protection of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites and weapon storage sites and the security of communication lines in its area of operations.

32. The total number of troops of an expanded UNAMSIL would be subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, as well as in the restructuring of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. As the overall security situation in the country improves, I would be prepared to recommend to the Security Council a reduction in the force level.

33. As indicated in my letter of 23 December, the new tasks falling to UNAMSIL would require robust rules of engagement for the entire United Nations force. The rules of engagement elaborated on the basis of the Mission's current mandate are deemed to be sufficiently strong in the present circumstances. However, UNAMSIL will keep the rules of engagement under constant review and propose any adjustments that may be required.

34. The induction of the required troops would have to keep pace with the withdrawal of ECOMOG, which would require close coordination with its command. The deployment of any additional UNAMSIL battalions would require transportation by air.

Mine action

35. Since mine warfare has been a feature of the conflict in certain areas of Sierra Leone, a mine action capacity will be required as part of UNAMSIL. In addition to mine clearance and unexploded ordnance disposal platoons, which will be deployed in the battalions to meet their operational needs, a mine action office will have to be established within UNAMSIL. The office would also act as coordinator for mine action activities, including those to be implemented by non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies operating in the country. In this connection, it would particularly focus on awareness training for UNAMSIL personnel in the area of mines/unexploded ordnance. Finally, once the situation has been assessed, the mine action office would contribute to the development of a strategy to meet any short-, medium- and long-term requirements for action with respect to mines/unexploded ordnance in Sierra Leone.

Civilian police

36. Up to 60 United Nations civilian police advisers, who would advise and assist, in close cooperation with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leonean police forces, would be required. They would also be deployed at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites and population centres to provide advice on the maintenance of law and order. This increase from the previous civilian police strength of six United Nations police advisers has become necessary since the Sierra Leonean law enforcement authorities will be required to step up their presence and activities in the countryside and at

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites to make up for the important role ECOMOG played in the maintenance of law and order.

37. As indicated above, the maintenance of law and order in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps is an area of particular concern. It is felt that this problem can best be addressed through a preventive approach, including an enhanced information policy, political engagement between the rebel leaders and the Government, efforts to shorten the period of encampment as much as possible and the general rehabilitation of the country. However, law and order problems have already occurred and should be expected when large numbers of ex-combatants are cantoned. If not addressed properly, such problems could have a detrimental effect on the peace process. Therefore, UNAMSIL should be prepared, if needed, to assist the Government in its efforts to maintain law and order at the sites. In this regard, the Government must deploy a credible law enforcement presence at the sites as soon as possible. Bearing in mind the present lack of adequately trained police personnel and equipment, I strongly encourage donors to provide the necessary assistance to the Government.

Civilian component

38. The concept of operations and the composition of the Mission's substantive civilian components would remain essentially as described in my report to the Security Council dated 30 July 1999 (S/1999/836). However, it would be my intention to establish additional United Nations civil affairs offices, comprising three civil affairs staff, at each of the four sector headquarters with a view to assisting the Government as it extends its authority to the countryside.

39. In order to support the effective functioning of an expanded UNAMSIL, it would be critical that additional administrative and logistical support be made available. To this end, an adequate increase in administrative and technical personnel as well as resources will be required. The cost estimates for the proposed expansion of UNAMSIL will be submitted to the Security Council shortly in an addendum to the present report.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

40. During the reporting period, the situation in Sierra Leone has remained difficult, and progress in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement has been very slow. However, the tension prevailing in some areas subsided somewhat following the recent deployment of UNAMSIL to the countryside.

41. It is obvious that, despite the progress made, the peace established in Sierra Leone is still very fragile. Tension and mistrust among the parties to the conflict continue, while the disarmament process has achieved only modest progress. In addition, unruly members of some armed groups continue to attack, rob and rape civilians in parts of the country, while humanitarian workers are denied access to large parts of the population.

42. There can be no justification for non-compliance or delays in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, for the continuing human rights abuses or

for not allowing humanitarian aid to reach those in need. I therefore call upon all political parties and their leaders to urge their followers to act responsibly so that the people of Sierra Leone can start to live a normal life.

43. In my letter of 23 December, I informed the Security Council that, following Nigeria's decision to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone, ECOMOG would be unable to continue to perform the vital functions of providing security, in particular in Freetown and at the international airport at Lungi, and protecting the Government of Sierra Leone.

44. In order to enable UNAMSIL to assume many of the functions that are now assigned to ECOMOG, I recommended that the Security Council authorize, as soon as possible, the expansion of UNAMSIL and a broadening of its mandate as described in paragraphs 23 to 38 of the present report. The rapid expansion of UNAMSIL will be indispensable in maintaining the necessary security conditions for the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the extension of State administration throughout the provinces and, in due course, the holding of elections in Sierra Leone.

45. Clearly, after more than eight years of brutal conflict, building trust and confidence will take time and will require a concerted effort by all parties in Sierra Leone parties as well as the international community. However, the responsibility for the success of the peace process ultimately lies with the people and leaders of Sierra Leone. It is crucial, therefore, that the Government of Sierra Leone take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan for the restructuring of the police and armed forces so that they will be able to safeguard fully the stability and security of the country once UNAMSIL begins its withdrawal following the elections next year.

46. I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Adeniji, and to the Force Commander, Major General Jetley, and to all the military and civilian personnel of UNAMSIL for their unwavering commitment and dedicated efforts in support of the peace process under difficult circumstances.

Annex

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 10 January 2000

Country	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
Bangladesh	12			12
Bolivia	4			4
Canada	5			5
China	6			6
Croatia	10			10
Czech Republic	5			5
Denmark	2			2
Egypt	10			10
France	3			3
Gambia	4			4
Ghana	1	3	776	780
India	14	15	1 413	1 442
Indonesia	10			10
Jordan	5			5
Kenya	11	11	821	843
Kyrgyzstan	2			2
Malaysia	10			10
Nepal	6			6
New Zealand	2			2
Nigeria	4	8	1 552	1 564
Norway	5			5
Pakistan	10			10
Russian Federation	14			14
Slovakia	2			2
Sweden	3			3
Thailand	5			5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	22			22
United Republic of Tanzania	12			12
Uruguay	11			11
Zambia	10			10
Total	220	37	4 562	4 819[a]

[a] Plus four civilian police observers from Namibia (Chief), Ghana, Kenya and Norway.

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SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1270 (1999) ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

Addendum

1. With reference to paragraph 39 of my report (S/2000/13), I wish to inform the Security Council that the financial implications of the expansion of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as described in paragraphs 23 to 38 of the report, for a four-and-a-half-month period from 15 February to 30 June 2000 would entail additional requirements in the order of some $110.8 million. The projection assumes the phased induction of an additional 5,100 troops comprising six infantry battalions and the necessary military support elements, for a total of 11,100 military personnel, and the deployment of 54 additional police advisers for an increased civilian police strength of 60 personnel. It is projected that a civilian staffing establishment of 752 international and local staff, representing an increase of 170 personnel compared with the current strength, will be required to support the military and civilian police components of the expanded UNAMSIL.

2. An indicative breakdown of the projection for the expansion of UNAMSIL by main categories of expenditure is provided, for information purposes, in the annex to the present addendum.

3. On that basis, the total estimated cost of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL) for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 is projected at $310.8 million, inclusive of $200 million already appropriated by the General Assembly in its resolution 54/241 of 23 December 1999 for the maintenance and provisional expansion of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the establishment and maintenance of UNAMSIL.

4. Should the Security Council authorize the expansion of UNAMSIL and a broadening of its mandate as described in paragraphs 23 to 38 of my report, the additional resources referred to in paragraph 1 above will be sought from the General Assembly.

Annex

Cost estimates for the expansion of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone for a four-and-a-half-month period

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Category	Cost estimates
I.	Military personnel	63 909
II.	Civilian personnel	3 716
III.	Operational requirements	
	1. Premises and accommodation	2 069
	2. Infrastructure repairs	200
	3. Transport operations	5 611
	4. Air operations	4 684
	5. Naval operations	-
	6. Communications	941
	7. Other equipment	3 573
	8. Supplies and services	12 137
	9. Air and surface freight	13 476
	Subtotal	42 691
IV.	Other programmes	
	1. Election-related supplies and services	-
	2. Public information programmes	77
	3. Training programmes	73
	4. Mine-clearing programmes	26
	5. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
	Subtotal	176
V.	United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi	-
VI.	Support account for peacekeeping operations	-
VII.	Staff assessment	263
	Total, categories I-VII	110 755

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GENERAL

S/2000/14
12 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 15 December 1999 by the Minister of External Relations, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, stating that Mr. Arnoldo Manuel Listre has been appointed representative of Argentina on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

00-23836 (E) 120100

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S/2000/15
12 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the appointment of the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

The Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG, Major-General Tariq Waseem Ghazi, completed his assignment on 31 December 1999 and has returned to the service of his Government. I would like to put on record my appreciation for General Ghazi's dedication to the cause of peace and for his exemplary work in UNOMIG over the past 15 months.

Following the usual consultations, it is my intention to appoint Major-General Anis Ahmed Bajwa of Pakistan to succeed General Ghazi. General Bajwa is expected to take up his functions in mid-January 2000.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

00-23775 (E) 120100

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S/2000/16
12 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 6 January 2000 (S/2000/15) concerning your intention to appoint Major-General Anis Ahmed Bajwa of Pakistan to the post of Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(Signed) Richard C. HOLBROOKE
President of the Security Council

00-23823 (E) 120100

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S/2000/17
12 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to the attached copies, in English and French, of the statement issued on 5 January 2000 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning the parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Croatia on 3 January 2000.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nuno BRITO
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative of Portugal
to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: English, French]

Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning the parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Croatia on 3 January 2000

The European Union welcomes the parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Croatia, on 3 January 2000. Those elections, which the international observers considered to have been conducted in a calm and orderly manner, with the voters able to express their political will freely, may represent a significant step towards drawing Croatia closer to the perspective of full integration into European structures.

The European Union congratulates the people of Croatia for the democratic manner in which the elections were conducted and calls for all political forces to respect and honour the electoral results.

The European Union reaffirms its readiness to develop and intensify its cooperation with the Republic of Croatia, should the future Government pursue meaningful reforms, deepening its democratic institutions, strengthening its respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and carrying through economic reforms, and take measures leading to ethnic reconciliation and regional peace and stability.